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DODD-FRANK’S CONFLICT MINERALS RULE: THE TIN
EAR OF GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS REGULATION
HENRY LOWENSTEIN*
From 2007-2012 the United States encountered its longest and deepest
economic recession since the 1930’s. Most analysts attribute the economic
contraction’s proximate cause to a systemic meltdown in the national and
world financial markets. This occurred due to the convergence of
government policy stimulating irrational lending practices in real estate (subprime mortgages), weak financial instruments based upon them along with
hedge fund manipulations and questionable if not fraudulent practices of
major financial institutions.1 Major financial institutions risked insolvency,
required government intervention2 and some such as the venerable financial
house, Lehman Brothers, went out of business altogether.
Out of investigations and resultant public political pressure, Congress
enacted the most sweeping banking and financial service market structural
reforms since the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.3 Thus, came about the lengthy
and controversial Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010.4 Not unlike other legislation by Congress, deep within it’s over
2,300 page of statutory text were provisions having nothing to do with the
financial services market or any cognizable theme of the legislation itself.
This paper examines one of those unrelated provisions, which have
recently come to light with recent realization of its potential massive adverse
impacts on business, manufacturing, and ultimately consumer costs of
products. Buried within Dodd-Frank’s statutory text is Section 1502, known
as the “Conflict Minerals Provision”5 (later developed into a “rule” and
hereafter “CMR’). The provision establishes a requirement that
*Ph.D., Professor, Management and Law, James P. and Elizabeth R. Blanton College of
Business Leadership Professor, Coastal Carolina University, Conway, S.C.
1
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Interpreting the Causes of the Great Recession of 2008, BIS
CONFERENCE LECTURE, June 2009, http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcictestimony/2009-1020-Stiglitz-article-2.pdf; Kip Beckman, What Caused the Financial Crises
and Recession of 2008?, INSIDE EDGE; CONF BD OF CANADA, February 16, 2010,
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/insideedge/2010/february-2010/feb16-what-caused-the.aspx.
2
Primarily the U.S. Treasury TARP Program (Troubled Asset Relief Program). See
Emergency Stabilization Act, P.L. 110-34 (2008). TARP was an over $1 billion purchase by
the U.S. government of financial institution assets to retain their institutional liquidity.
3
Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 et. seq. (1933).
4
Pub. L. 111-203; 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (2010) (hereafter referred to as “Dodd-Frank”).
5
Id. § 1502.
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manufacturers who are publicly listed corporations trace, certify and report
the origins and use of four specific minerals, gold and the “Three T’s” (tin,
tungsten and tantalum) used in modern day manufacturing to verify they did
not originate from mines in the “Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly
Zaire) or adjoining countries.”6 These minerals are collectively known as so
called, “Conflict Minerals.”7 The law neither bans the purchase, import or
use of these minerals from the identified nations. Rather, it is (at this point)
limited to reporting, but as this article will outline, that reporting is neither
benign in its effect nor limited in its cost burden to industry.
The law further delegated regulations and enforcement of CMR not to
an existing federal regulatory agency most qualified in expertise and
oversight of minerals or natural resource or import-exports, but to the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); a financial regulatory agency
with no prior mission or expertise in any aspect remotely related to the
subject matter jurisdiction imposed by Congressional mandate.8 This was
done at a time when the SEC is overwhelmed with financial market cases
from its existing mission, Dodd-Frank financial market mandates, and the
effect of 2013 federal budgetary sequestration reducing all agency budget
resources.
Congress’s choice of mechanism for §1502 raises serious questions
about the legality of the law, the method chosen to address the issue, matters
of equal protection of American firms and industries, the financial burden
placed on both the SEC and businesses at a time of recession and public
outcry (both among those against regulatory interference in Commerce and
by those who approve of it), better effectiveness and efficiency in regulatory
oversight. Indeed, at a time when both parties in Congress and the Executive
branch agree in principle of the need to improve effectiveness and efficiency
of government, the Conflict Minerals Rule presents one example of a “tin
ear” in public policy and business law.
6

Id.
The term “conflict mineral” is defined in Section 1502(e)(4) of the Act as (A) columbitetantalite, also known as coltan (the metal ore from which tantalum is extracted); cassiterite
(the metal ore from which tin is extracted); gold; wolframite (the metal ore from which
tungsten is extracted); or their derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its derivatives
determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo or an adjoining country. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Final Rule:
Conflict Minerals,” 17 C.F.R. Parts 240 and 249b [Release No. 34-67716, File No. S7-40-10],
August 22, 2012. [Hereafter, referenced as “CMR”], at footnote 6. We reference in this paper
from the original release. The Conflicts Mineral Rule was subsequently published in the
Federal Register on September 12, 2012, see F.R. 77 (177) 56274 et. seq.
8
For example, the U.S. Government has agencies with better regulatory fit such as
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Customs
Service, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Interior or perhaps even the U.S.
Geological Survey among others.
7
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Public policy debates often assert the inefficiency, cost burden and even
illogical processes that occur in government regulation of business have the
effect of delaying innovation, diverting management energy and adding
deadweight costs to both the cost of production and the operation of
government itself. The Conflict Minerals Rule presents us with the perfect
storm object lesson on the perils of poorly defined government regulation,
well meaning in its intent, but functionally expensive, irrational and
inoperative in its implementation.
In this article we will discuss how the convergence of the CMR’s
deficiencies add to costs of business, inefficiencies in the regulatory
structure, conflict with constitutional rights, legislative intent-statutory
provisions; all producing a chaotic mix which serves to not only fail to
achieve the purported public policy goal Congress established, but actually
exacerbate the very human rights situation at issue. The CMR presents a case
study in point of the long-standing historical observation that government
makes for poor businessmen and businesses poor foreign policy diplomats.
This article will first provide an overview of the Conflicts Minerals
Rule, the recent SEC implementation rules and its impact on business. In the
second part, we examine the legal challenges to the law, many of which are
already before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) v. SEC, its initial
hearings being scheduled for May 2013.9
Finally, we discuss conclusions and unintended consequences even now
observed as the rule nears implementation.

I. THE CONFLICTS MINERALS RULE: A CONFLICT OF POLICIES
The famous American journalist and social critic, H. L. Mencken (“Sage
of Baltimore”), ever skeptic of government once remarked, “The urge to save
humanity is almost always a false front for the urge to rule.”10
Whether out of humanitarian motives, or, a Mencken-alluded desire for
economic control, Congress added §1502 into the Dodd-Frank Act to address
its concerns with adverse humanitarian conditions in one African nation e.g.
the Democratic Republic of Congo (“hereafter DRC”). In so doing, Congress
posed a new and perhaps unprecedented sea change direction in traditional
Federal business regulatory policy by implementing selective foreign policy
9

National Association of Manufacturers, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America and Business Roundtable v. Securities and Exchange Commission, Amnesty
International USA, Amnesty International, LTD, Case No. 12-1422, D.C. Cir., January 13,
2013. (Hereafter, referenced as “NAM”) [Author’s note: Final arguments were heard by the
D.C. Cir. on January 7, 2014; decision pending at the time of writing of this article.]
10
H. L Mencken Quotes, http://www.whale.to/a/mencken.html (last visited March 18, 2013).
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and its attendant costs exclusively and directly upon publicly traded
companies.
It further delegated oversight to non-traditional regulatory agencies.11
Historically, U.S. regulatory structure placed oversight over federal mandates
in the hands of agencies with specific subject matter, technical or legal
expertise over the issue regulated. Thus, for example, the former Interstate
Commerce Commission regulated railroads (later adding pipelines);12 The
Federal Aviation Administration regulates aviation.13 All expertise in nuclear
minerals, materials and related atomic energy matters is given to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC).14
The Conflict Minerals Rule, however, presents a regulatory anomaly.
Here the rule governs manufacturers (and only those in publicly-listed firms),
over very narrow selected (one might opine arbitrarily-selected) list of raw
materials, solely at this point for information purposes. The rule is delegated
to a regulatory agency lacking subject matter mission, expertise or resources
to implement; the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); its
mission explicitly regulatory over financial markets and their operation.15
The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to
protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate
capital formation.16

11
Note: Dodd-Frank does include two other specialized corporate disclosures of a nontraditional, non-financial market nature to the SEC under Title XV. Section 1503 requires
public disclosure of mine safety issues, violations and orders issued to domestic mines under
the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), and, Section 1504 requires
corporations engaged in oil and natural gas development to annually report on (legal)
payments made to the U.S. or any foreign government entity. However, both these provisions
have a direct material impact on investors and thus are consistent with the Commission’s
stated mission. See: “Dodd-Frank Act Rulemaking: Specialized Corporate Disclosure,” U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, (http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/doddfrank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml) (last visited October 12, 2012).
12
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (1887).
13
Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (Successor legislation to Air Commerce Act, 44
Stat. 568 (1926) and Civil Aeronautics Act, 52 Stat. 973 (1938)).
14
See Energy Reorganization Act, P.L. 93-438 (1974).
15
Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77a et. seq., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15. U.S.C.
§ 78a et. seq.
16
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited October 22, 2012).
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A. What is the Conflicts Minerals Rule (Section 1502)?17
The purported public purpose for the Conflict Minerals Rule (CMR)
will be discussed shortly. At the outset, however, let us describe in summary
the compliance mandate of the rule, itself. In August, 2012 after
extraordinary public comment, the SEC issued an over 300 page final rule
and explanatory notes, promulgating a three phase process for reporting the
origins of the four designated minerals (aka “Conflict Minerals”) to disclose
whether their origins are from the DRC or adjoining countries (aka “conflict
countries”).
Step One requires companies to determine if the conflict minerals used
are “necessary to the functionality or production of the product.” If not, no
disclosure is required and the company need not go further with its analysis
or reporting diligence.18
Step Two requires that a company using the designated minerals make a
“reasonable inquiry” into its country of origin. The firm then reports
whether: (a) they know the materials were not from a conflict country; (b)
have reason to believe they are (or are not) from a conflict country, or, (c) the
materials came from scrap or recycled materials were the origin of the
mineral is unknown.19
Step Three requires the company to conduct a substantial due diligence
on the source and chain of custody of the conflict minerals, based on an
internationally established framework. The resulting report must be audited
independently and the entire report and process reported separately from the
annual 10-K report to the SEC by a new form, Form SD, on a calendar year
basis. The SEC has exempted all stockpiles of materials purchased prior to
2014.20
Both the statute and rule provide no prohibition on purchases of conflict
minerals from the DRC or elsewhere, no penalties, criminal or civil, and no
other legal sanctions direct or implied. Thus, while Congress saw fit to raise
the DRC’s human rights problems to this statutory level, it nevertheless left it
perfectly legal to continue trade and commerce in the metals in question.
The law and the rule’s purpose in theory is to attempt by public
disclosure to embarrass companies from using materials of DRC origin, thus
putting a chilling effect on future purchases and consequently restraining
revenue to bad actors in the DRC who are causing human rights violations.

17

Exchange Act, supra note 15, § 13(p) and SEC implementation regulations, 17 C.F.R. Parts
240 and 249b et. seq.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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The only penalty is that which the law current grants the SEC for failure to
file reports under the Exchange Act.21
Each of CFR steps contains subcategories and an actual serpentine flow
chart (displayed in Exhibit A) within the SEC rule and reproduced herein.22
As will be discussed, the terminology is often vague, ill defined or undefined,
to the point of effectively precluding any rational implementation to industry
or the SEC despite the SEC’s own best efforts to do so.

B. Scope-Public Objectives: General Overview
As an initial point of analysis, there is no question that the rule clearly
falls within Congress’s enumerated power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce.23 Moreover, that the Conflict
Minerals Rule is well meaning as an expression of national human rights
policy there can be no doubt. Congress was concerned about the horrible
violence and outrageous violation of human rights by armed groups in the
Eastern Congo, uncontrolled by DRC’s central government and the resultant
corrupt funding of their atrocities in the mining and trade of minerals. The
U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) found over 9% of DRC’s
population negatively impacted from these conditions over 2009-2010.24 All
parties in the debate certainly stipulate that the human rights conditions in the
DRC are dreadful and the opponents of CMR have no issue with public
policy to address it; on its face.25
Congress was heavily lobbied by non-government organizations such as
Amnesty International, Global Witness among others. With forthcoming
elections and desires of a number of Congressmen, the Dodd-Frank law in
legislative process at the time became merely a convenient vehicle to attach
this rule. Buried in the law’s massive text, CMR escaped public and industry
scrutiny finding itself fairly insulated from isolation and removal.
That said, a threshold problem of the law is apparent from the outset.
That is the human rights conditions enumerated in the DRC are not exclusive
to the DRC. In fact, on the U.S. State Department’s list of nations with
human rights abuses the DRC is not at the top. In fact, the DRC does not
21

Id. § 13 (a) et. seq. (penalty is limited to civil fines for failure to file).
CMR, supra note 7, et. seq.
23
U.S. Const. art. I,, sec. 8, cl. 3.
24
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Information on the
Rate of Sexual Violence in War Torn Eastern DRC and Adjoining Countries (July 13, 2011)
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-702.
25
Brief for National Association of Manufacturers, et.al, as Amici Curiae (Experts on the
Democratic Republic of The Congo) Supporting Petitioners, NAM, supra, note 9, Document
No. 1416913 at 1-7 (hereafter, “Experts Amicus Brief”), provides a short history of the
violence and origin of violence in the DRC.
22
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even make the list of Freedom House’s annual “Worst of the Worst”
Repressive Societies List.26 Moreover, as we will discuss in the article,
nations of worst human rights abuses that are major producers of the Conflict
Minerals are not subject to the law.

C. Conflict Minerals in Industry and Society
It is well recognized in our Twenty-First Century that advances in
technology have caused industry to depend on trade to obtain a host of key
minerals and “rare earth materials” necessary for modern products. The
minerals chosen in §1502 fall squarely in this category. Unfortunately, when
the universe and planet earth was formed the location of these mineral
deposits recognized no national boundaries, and, as often has been the case,
ended up within the borders of nation states of questionable ethical and moral
repute.27
Tantalum is a necessary element used in mobile telephones, computers,
digital phones, televisions, automotive electronics and related electronic
devices as well as carbide tools and jet engine components. It is a significant
component used in high precision medical implants and prosthetic devices.28
Tin also is essential to electronic circuits, alloys, metal plating and
solders as well as traditional uses in cans and containers.29 Tin, once
considered a low value metal used in among other things canning, has
become an essential element in solder used to connect circuits in the most
widely used consumer electronics and specialty electronics. For example, an
Apple Ipad (tablet) uses 7,000 solder points of tin solder. A flat screen TV
contains 4.8 grams of tin solder, the typical smart phone over 3 grams.30
Tungsten is used in metal wires, electrodes, lighting contacts,
electronics, aerospace components, heating, ball point pens, automotive and

26

FREEDOM HOUSE, Worst of the Worst 2012: The World’s Most Repressive Societies,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/worst-worst-2012-worlds-mostrepressive-societies (last visited, March 18, 2013).
27
The situation is reminiscent of the often quoted remark of the late Golda Meir, Prime
Minister of Israel (1898-1973) commenting on the presence of oil in many unstable countries,
“Let me tell you one thing I have against Moses. He took us 40 years in the desert in order to
bring us to the one place in the Middle East that has no oil." Prime Minister Speech 1973.
28
SEC’s Final Rules on Conflict Minerals Disclosure Expected to Have Broad Impact,
COOLEYALERT! (Sept. 12, 2012) http://www.cooley.com/66973.
29
Id.
30
Cam Simpson, Tech’s Tragic Secret, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 27-Sept. 2, 2012, at
52. (Five Apple I-pad electronic tablets consume as much tin solder as is found in the average
4,000 pound automobile).
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welding applications It is found in golf clubs, medical devices and window
heating systems.31
Gold needs no introduction. Beyond its jewelry, ornamental and
monetary uses, gold is used in electronic components in communication,
aerospace and medical devices; among uses in other high technology devices
and components.32 Hence these minerals find themselves in a host of
products from ubiquitous household items to the most sophisticated high
technology products and applications.
The key conundrum posed by the CMR of course is that the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) (or its “adjoining nations’) is not the only nation
that is adversely affected by human rights “bad actors” for whom, at least at
this time, the DRC government lacks capacity to control. Other world nations
presenting like extraordinary social problems by government sanctioned
actions or independent actors are not covered under this legislation nor are
the four minerals enumerated confined exclusively to socially responsible
nations. In fact the record shows quite the contrary. If there exist other, yea,
even worse human rights abusive nations supplying these materials, then why
confine this commercial law to this single bad actor state and not others?
Thus, a key legal question is why a “compelling state interest” to the DNR
and no others?
The disparity in public policy present is so extensive as to lack clear and
convincing reasoning from Congress. The answer to this question leads us to
the issue of arbitrary selection as one basis of legal challenge to the rule
under the federal administrative law’s arbitrary and capricious doctrine.33 As
we will see in the next section, §1502’s statutory deficiencies as well of those
of SEC’s implementation rule, leave the law subject to a host of legal
challenges.

II. REGULATORY MIASMA: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO
THE CONFLICT MINERALS RULE
The Conflict Minerals Rule poses a host of legal complications that are
pending judicial review. In this section we outline key areas problematic to
the statutory language and regulatory implementation of CMR. Some, but not
all of these issues have been raised in the pending NAM case.
31
Id. (Most consumers know tungsten as the filament element within conventional
incandescent light bulbs.)
32
Id.
33
There should be a clear error of judgment; an action not based upon consideration of
relevant factors and so is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with law or if it was taken without observance of procedure required by law
(Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United States EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1297 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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A. The SEC as Administrator, Rulemaker and Enforcer of the Conflict
Mineral Rule
On first impression courts would certainly recognize the questionable
aspect of delegating the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for
the objectives and task of making operational the CMR. Given the
Commission’s established mission, expertise and resources, the SEC appears
to be a demonstrably improper forum for the regulation. This is because the
SEC’s scope of jurisdiction is limited to publicly listed corporations on U.S.
stock exchanges. Its expertise is primarily financial.
Privately held corporations are outside the jurisdiction of the SEC and
the CMR. Thus, the rule has no application to non-exchange listed firms. In
the global marketplace, multi-nationals have the ability to shift the
nationality of subsidiaries and manufacturing to entities outside U.S. long
arm statutes or jurisdiction of U.S. public exchanges escaping the law,
leaving the reporting burden primarily upon small domestic manufacturers.
The rule and its cost and productivity implications create a substantial
unleveled playing field for manufacturers. The exclusion of private firms is
irrational.
The SEC, itself, is ill equipped to monitor compliance, its staff primarily
skilled in securities markets and financial regulation. The agency’s focus
over the years has been expertise in legal, accounting, and cyber systems,
specifically focused to keeping capital markets open and honest. Since the
collapse of Enron in the 2000’s and the enactment of the first major modern
financial industry reform, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002),34 the SEC has been
challenged with major demands incongruent with its staffing and budget.
In the light of the fallout from the 2008 financial collapse and recession,
the agency is further overwhelmed with rule marking, enforcement and
compliance matters to its core mission on top of those financial duties
imposed by Dodd-Frank’s other provisions. Delegating the CMR rule to the
SEC is analogous to government mandating that a cardiac patient be seen by
an ophthalmologist on the basis that they are both medical doctors!
One aspect of CMR provides an object case in point. Under the CMR,
reports are required where the conflict minerals uses are “necessary to the
functionality” of the product.35 Defining functional necessity is an
engineering question in most cases. Who decides whether a metallic cover
inclusive of tungsten is “necessary to the functionality” or merely packaging
and appearance design in which case it is not a “functional’ part.36 This
34

15 U.S.C. 7201 (2012).
SEC’s Final Rules on Conflict Minerals Disclosure Expected to Have Broad Impact,
COOLEY ALERT! (Sept. 12, 2012) http://www.cooley.com/66973.
36
Id.
35
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would require the SEC to hire expensive engineers or contract with
engineering consultants where firms challenge their reporting requirement.
Likewise is the term “necessary to the production” where a conflict mineral
may not be a part of the product but part of the production process. The SEC
lacks such technical expertise and to date any reasonable resources to do so.
Hence, the delegation in itself appears arbitrary to the point where it ensures
the rule constructively cannot be enforced.
In FY 2010 the entire budget for the SEC was slightly over $1.3 billion
of which nearly 60% was dedicated to securities market enforcement and
examination.37 In 2013, the SEC is taking the same 2.3% across the board cut
under 2013 budget sequestration as all Federal agencies as well as
Congressional efforts to further reduce its budget.38
The Dodd-Frank Act’s financial provisions alone add to the agency’s
regulatory tasks. The Wall St. Journal reported in May 2011 that both the
statutory language and implementation regulations for the Dodd-Frank Act
governing the financial industry (among other visual analogies) were
equivalent to 21.2 times the height of the Statute of Liberty or 2.6 times the
height of the Empire State Building.39
The United State confronted with a Federal budget deficit in FY 2012 of
over $1 trillion and a Federal debt of over $16 trillion, regardless of political
party in power, reductions in government spending will occur. To date
Congress has shown no willingness to substantially increase the
Commission’s resources.40
Hence, the SEC will be forced to make priorities. In the conflict
between its primary statutory duty to securities markets and the CMR, it is
more likely than not the CMR will be relegated to the back burner of
enforcement if not lose out altogether. Consequently, businesses will have
incurred large costs of reporting and its attendant diversion of staff resources
to no public benefit, placing U.S. industries at a greater competitive
disadvantage in the marketplace. The SEC faces the challenge of being a
depository of millions of reports unprocessed or read

37

Michael J. Ryan, U.S. Capital Markets Competitiveness: The Unfinished Agenda, U.S.
CHAMBER OF COM., Washington, DC, Summer 2011, Figure 4 at 18.
38
Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Budget in Line of Fire as House Panel Seeks Cuts, REUTERS
(February 26, 2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/26/us-usa-fiscal-house-secidUSBRE91P0VD20130226.
39
Jean Eaglesham, Overhaul Grows and Slows, THE WALL ST. JOURNAL, May 2, 2011.
40
In fact at the time of this writing the SEC faces the mandated 2.3% across the board budget
cut required by Congress’s Budget Sequestration schedule to go into effect February 28, 2013.
Such a budget cut would further debilitate the SEC from carrying out its statutory mission.
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B. Arbitrary and Capricious Standard to Public Policy
A threshold issue in CMR is its isolation of the DNR for reporting
purposes while ignoring substantially larger producers of conflict minerals
who have demonstrably worse human rights records. This raises a key issue
of CMR failing to meet the arbitrary and capricious standard the court’s
hold to regulatory actions.
Current conceptions of “arbitrary and capricious” review focus on
whether agencies have adequately explained their decisions in
statutory, factual, scientific, or otherwise technocratic terms.
Courts, agencies, and scholars alike, accordingly, generally have
accepted the notion that influences from political actors, including
the President and Congress, cannot properly help to explain
administrative action for purposes of arbitrary and capricious
review.41
This standard has been long held under the Administrative Procedures
Act42 and its subsequent judicial rulings which established the “Hard Look”
rule in agency regulatory review.43 The Hard Look Doctrine arises out of the
case State Farm v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
(1983).44 This doctrine for the most part continues in judicial review. For
example in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007), the Supreme Court reversed the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the grounds that the rule in
question was made with and based upon no scientific or expert basis.
Regulatory agencies have often depended on the defense afforded by
Chevron v. Natural Resources Council45, to uphold their rulemaking against
the Arbitrary and Capricious Doctrine. Here court deference is given if: (1)
Congress spoke to the precise question at issue, and (2) if the statute is silent
or ambiguous on the specific issue, is the regulatory construction permissible
under the statute?46

41

Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119
YALE L.J. 2 (2009).
42
5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A)-(C), “shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action when found to be
arbitrary.”
43
Watts, supra note 42, at 5. (“The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that
agencies act in a manner that passes “arbitrary and capricious” review.” See; 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A) (2012). The term “hard look” review developed in the D.C. Circuit as a judicial
gloss on the meaning of the APA’s arbitrary and capricious test.).
44
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
45
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
46
Id. at 842, see also Wright v. Everson, 543 F.3d 649 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Nevertheless, Chevron does not give infinite leave to Congress or
agencies to promulgate laws and rules that lack objective standards or
expertise. It is here that the CMR fails even the most liberal test. For
example, let us examine the situation in the designated conflict mineral,
Gold.
The DRC is not the largest producer of gold with unconscionable human
rights conditions. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the DRC in fact
is #77 in gold production. Of much higher production are nations of highly
questionable human rights issues and listed on the U.S. State Department’s
list of human rights violators.47 These nations include: Peoples Republic of
China (#1), Russia (#4), Uzbekistan (#10), Zimbabwe (#23), Iran (#66),
Cuba (#69), and Myanmar [Burma] (#76).48 Likewise, both in Tin and
Tungsten, the largest producers, particularly the Peoples Republic of China
and Russia are market leaders in production list with other non-African
problematic human rights-issue nations also producers. Clearly, turning a
blind eye to the two largest producers (Russia and China) are purely political
factors, not objective economic ones which would appear impermissible, not
withstanding scrutiny under the Hard Look rule.
Tin poses a clear question in this regard. A major 2012 investigative
expose by Bloomberg Businessweek, detailed the tragic and horrifying
conditions in the tin mines of Bangka-Belitung Province of Indonesia that
produce in excess of 30% of the world’s tin ore. Indonesia, however, is not
on the human rights abuse list and is an ally of the United States. 40% of
world tin ore comes from the Peoples Republic of China, not an ally of the
United States and high on the list of human rights abuses, but not subject to
the CMR rule.49
While the CMR rule applies strictly to reporting on gold and “The Three
T’s,” there is genuine risk that unchecked, the rule could be expanded out to
other minerals, especially those in high demand by high technology
companies. For example, the electronics industry is dependent on a host of
minerals generally classified as “Rare Earths” such as yttrium, (necessary for
important electronics such as cell phones and medical uses).
Here one finds the Peoples Republic of China to be the single dominant
world producer.50 In short, if the public policy goal is human rights the
singling out of just one small African nation and a number of “adjoining”
countries which may or may not remain on the U.S. State Department
47

U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Human Rights Reports 2011, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ (last
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Human Rights watch list in any given year, while excluding nations
demonstrably higher on the State Dept. list raises the question of
impermissible arbitrary state selection, certainly suspect classification. This
then adds to the fact that a substantial business cost is imposed on an
arbitrary selection of industry to report mineral origin.
What is the “compelling state interest” for DRC versus other alleged
abusive human rights states? These questions are ultimately to be solved by
the federal courts or a subsequent re-consideration of the rule by Congress,
itself.

C. Rational Basis Test—Vagueness and Equal Protection
Close on the heels of both the questionable regulatory delegation and
the arbitrary & capricious doctrine issues is the very serious matter of CMR
failing the judicial rational basis test. Coupled with this factor is the
extraordinary vague and ill-defined language of the statute and rule along
with its failure to provide equal protection under the law to industry, both
raising Constitutional Fourteenth Amendment issues.51 We take these
together as they are interrelated. Technology corporations such as Microsoft,
General Electric and Motorola Solutions, adversely affected by the CMR are
already signaling intent to challenge the legality of the SEC rules52 and the
pending NAM case may not be the only legal challenge facing the law.
1. Rational Basis Test.
The Rational Basis Test has long been a judicial review staple but one
with a very high bar for challengers to overcome. Simply defined, when the
government engages in commercial regulation (or that of individuals), it is
subject to a Rational Basis Test for its decisions. The judicial test requires the
government regulation to bear some rational relation to the state interest and
not merely be an arbitrary selection or selective enforcement that
compromises equal protection rights of similarly situated entities.53
Under rational basis test for constitutionality, primary issues are
whether government has power or authority to regulate particular
area in question and whether method that government has chosen
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U.S. Const. amend. XIV, et. seq.
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to accomplish that goal bears rational relation to ultimate
objective.54
Over time, this test has been interpreted by the Court as a high bar with
deference paid to the government and burden of proof to challengers.55
However, the court in its application demands very clear objectively based
rationality for such classifications. For example from rational basis analysis
in Romer:
In order to reconcile the Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no
person shall be denied equal protection with the practical reality
that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, the Court
has stated that it will uphold a law that neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class so long as the
legislative classification bears a rational relation to some
independent and legitimate legislative end.56
In enacting §1502 at best the most logical and rational of approaches by
Congress would have been to simply require reporting of the use of Conflict
Minerals ONLY by those firms who actually purchase the targeted materials
from DNR (or other subject nations) and to apply the rule to all similarly
situated entities regardless of form of ownership. As the law now stands
every public corporation must prove a negative, an anathema to the
American legal system concept.
Under §1502 and its recently promulgated SEC implementation rules,
only those companies subject to the Exchange Acts, i.e. publicly traded
companies, are subject to the Conflict Mineral Rule.57 Consequently, firms
that are privately owned, or publicly owned foreign transplant manufacturers
not listed on United States stock exchanges or government-owned
corporations are exempt from the rule.
Given the stated purpose of CMR, those American companies covered
under the rule are segregated into an arbitrary class and placed in material
competitive-cost disadvantage in the marketplace with private (or otherwise
non-listed) competitors. The SEC estimates those subject to the rule to be
266,175 companies of which 262,524 (98.6%) are defined as small
businesses (those employing 500 or less workers).58 The rule raises legal
54
Cash Inn of Dade, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 938 F.2d 1239 (11th Cir. 1991)
(emphasis added).
55
See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) U.S. R.R. Ret.
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 186 (1980); Cash Inn of Dade, supra note 55.
56
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 9-14 (1996) (citation omitted).
57
CMR, supra note 7, at 7.
58
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questions of Equal Protection, given the large number of manufacturers not
covered by the reporting mandate in the same industries competing under the
same circumstances.
A demonstration of this situation can be viewed by examining Forbes’
annual list “America’s Largest Private Companies.” Of the top 100
corporations on the list, fully twenty-five are major manufacturers or
suppliers who would be potential users of conflict minerals. Below is a
sample including rank and revenue:
#2
#5
#25
#26
#29
#32
#39

Koch Industries
Bechtel
Tenaska Energy
Kiewit Construction
SC Johnson & Son
CDW
Renco Group

$109 billion
27.9 billion
9.95 billion
9.94 billion
9.00 billion
8.80 billion
7.75 billion59

Both the isolation of one nation producing the conflict minerals and the
application of the CMR to only publicly listed companies, clearly raises the
specter of suspect classifications. In Moreno, Justice Brennan made clear: “A
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest such as will sustain a legislative
classification against an equal protection challenge.”60
In Nordlinger, the Supreme Court made clear that equal protection
under the 14th Amendment does not preclude classifications. However, it
merely prohibits governmental decision makers from “treating differently
persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”61
Likewise, the Supreme Court has stated in the past that social and
economic suspect classifications that impinge on fundamental rights cannot
survive a rational basis test where there is clear showing of arbitrariness and
irrationality in the classification selection.62 The Hard Look test suggests that
Congress cannot articulate an objective, factual, and non-political reason for
CMR’s suspect geographical classification.

59

Americas Largest Private Companies 2011, FORBES (November 16, 2011). (In prior years
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60
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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D. Equal Protection and Vagueness
The Rational Basis test further brings us to the issue of the equal
protection issue as can be seen in the electronics market directly impacted.
Dell Computer, one of the world’s largest producers recently announced a
stock buyback to go private.63 Hence, Dell would now be exempt from the
rule creating an equal protection and anti-competitive issue for Dell’s
primary publicly listed competitors such as Hewett-Packard (HP) and IBM.
Likewise, in the automobile industry, both General Motors and Ford are
publicly listed companies, Chrysler is not. Thus, two of the “Big Three”
American motor vehicle manufacturers, Ford and General Motors, are placed
on an inequitable footing with the third, Chrysler. Neither of these cases can
pass muster under a rational basis examination relative to the stated objective
of Congress in stemming commerce with the DNR in conflict minerals.
Another related major issue is the continuing vague language of the
provision and its implementation regulations to date. It is often the case that
laws and regulations have verbal ambiguities that can be corrected through
contextual interpretation. It is quite another situation when the text of a
regulation is legally vague, i.e. where the actual meaning is so uncertain as to
defy definition; more precisely the uncertainly causes such complexity as to
make for impracticality in operation.64
Even in its revised rules, the SEC after voluminous public comment
cannot operationally define to any reasonable certainty what constitutes
material terms in CMR such as “necessary to the functionality,” who is really
a “manufacturer,” or “contract to manufacturer,” all of which are essential to
carrying out the statutory language of §1502. Defining for example,
“adjoining nations” is left to a State Department list that is in an annual state
of flux, even changing during the calendar year period for this regulatory
reporting. Firms could face an annual moving target.
As but one demonstration of the point, let us look at the SEC definition
of the key term “necessary to the functionality.”
In determining whether a conflict mineral is “necessary to the
functionality” of a product, an issuer should consider: (1) whether
63

Michael J. De La Merced & Quentin Hardy, Dell is $24 Billion Deal to go Private, N.Y.
TIMES, (Feb. 5, 2013) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/05/dell-sets-23-8-billion-deal-togo-private/.
64
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS,
(Thompson/West, 2012) at 31, 33. Vague terminology is even more problematic where its
reasonable meaning cannot be sustained by the “Fair Reading” Method, i.e. “determining the
application of governing text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully
competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued.” Id. at 34
(emphasis added).
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the conflict mineral is intentionally added to the product or any
component of the product and is not a naturally-occurring byproduct; (2) whether the conflict mineral is necessary to the
product’s generally expected function, use, or purpose; and (3) if
conflict mineral is incorporated for purposes of ornamentation,
decoration or embellishment, whether the primary purpose of the
product is ornamentation or decoration.65
Nevertheless, even with a high burden placed upon plaintiffs who allege
rational basis defects, Congress has an affirmative duty to enact legislation
and regulatory implementation on a rational basis.
Court may invalidate legislation enacted under the commerce
clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for
congressional finding that regulated activity affects interstate
commerce or that there is no reasonable connection between
regulatory means selected and asserted ends.66
Notwithstanding, these hurtles, the CMR and its analysis by the SEC is
replete with admissions as to the inability of the government to explain its
selectivity versus other similarly situated commercial international trade
situations. Here the SEC openly admits the inability to conduct an analysis of
benefits other than in the thinnest subjective terms.
We are unable to quantify the impact of each of the decisions we
discuss below with any precision because reliable, empirical
evidence regarding the effects is not readily available to the
Commission, and commentators did not provide sufficient
information to allow us to do so. Thus, in this section, our
discussion on the costs and benefits of our individual discretionary
choices is qualitative....67
The terminology is facially indistinct to raise the question of who
determines these factors; the company’s production engineers, designers,
users or imposition of judgment by Commission bureaucrats and staff
uneducated in product design? CMR’s murky language presents a quagmire
of regulatory conflict, administrative law litigation (ALJ decision making)
and general confusion to industry and regulators for years to come.
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CMR, supra note 7, at 22.
Hodel, supra note 63, at 321 (emphasis added).
67
CMR, supra note 7, at 268, 269.
66

206/Vol. XXIV/Southern Law Journal

Ultimately, the deficiencies posed by CMR in the totality of
circumstance would force either the SEC or some judicial process to go
essentially beyond the statutory text to give operational meaning to the rule.
That is a line of “overreach” historically eschewed by the Supreme Court. As
Justice Cardozo articulated in Great Northern Railway, “We have not
traveled in our search for the meaning of the lawmakers, beyond the borders
of the statute.”68
Because material terms within CMR are so vague, the rule is exposed to
great risk of failing the test of constitutionality. To be sure, federal courts
have set a high bar asserting a due process violation under the legal doctrine
of vagueness. "Uncertainty ... is not enough for [the commercial regulatory
statute] to be unconstitutionally vague; rather, it must be substantially
incomprehensible."69
The legal threshold, however, for “void of vagueness” would certainly
suggest that a rule which is vastly incomprehensible to the regulatory agency
itself and thus to the industry regulated runs substantial risk of a successful
constitutional challenge.
To be fair, the SEC in its announcement and review of the rule certainly
implies throughout that CMR had been imposed on the agency and admits to
its challenges and lack of preparedness in carrying out this Congressional
mandate. As such, the SEC itself unilaterally held up implementation of the
rule and reporting until 2014 and established a phase-in period, perhaps in
hopes Congress, itself would revisit the propriety of the issue or repeal the
rule altogether prior to that date and spare the agency its negative operational
and legal impacts. The SEC’s delaying action, itself. is questionable as the
statute gave it no authority to do so.70

E. Costs and Undue Burden to Business
What could be the costs of such a rule that is merely “reporting” in
nature and what are the true benefits? Is CMR merely a benign disclosure or
an undue burden on business? It is here the true potential damage to the
competitiveness of industry, ultimately hitting the consumer pocketbook is
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demonstrated. As with all federal rules, the SEC is required by law to assess
the total cost-benefit impact of new regulations.71
Specifically, the SEC is required by the National Securities Market
Improvement Act72 to among other things, consider whether an action “will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation” whenever it is
“engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest.”73
Furthermore, the SEC has an explicit statutory requirement under the
Exchange Act of 193474 to avoid rulemaking that has the effect of obstructing
or lessening competition.
The Commission and the Secretary of the Treasury, in making rules
and regulations pursuant to any provisions of this chapter, shall
consider among other matters the impact any such rule or
regulation would have on competition. The Commission and the
Secretary of the Treasury shall not adopt any such rule or
regulation which would impose a burden on competition not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this
chapter. The Commission and the Secretary of the Treasury shall
include in the statement of basis and purpose incorporated in any
rule or regulation adopted under this chapter, the reasons for the
Commission’s or the Secretary’s determination that any burden on
competition imposed by such rule or regulation is necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter.75
In its final rule, the SEC staff, itself, admitted to an initial deadweight
cost to industry of $3 to $4 billion with annual compliance cost of $207
million to $609 million each year thereafter.76 However, an analysis by what
the SEC refers to as the “University Group,” a large study conducted by lead
econometric researcher; Tulane University, estimated the initial deadweight
costs to be $7.93 billion and compliance costs of $207 million a year,
thereafter.77 The NAM estimates costs to be $9 to $16 billion.78
71
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Notwithstanding, the statutory requirements of the Exchange Acts to
SEC rule making, the Commission, challenged to calculate a cost-benefit of
its CMR rule, the SEC admits its inability to qualify benefits for analysis and
its lacking the analytic tools of its ordinary mission to do so.
The statute therefore aims to achieve compelling social benefits,
which we are unable to readily quantify with any precision, both
because we do not have the data to quantify the benefits and
because we are not able to assess how effective Section 1502 will
be in achieving those benefits. Additionally, the social benefits are
quite different from the economic or investor protection benefits
that our rules ordinarily strive to achieve.79
While the Commission is required by law to assess benefits to costs, it
declined to even attempt a quantified benefit calculation.80 The SEC did,
however, conduct an extensive analysis of costs to industry that remain
controversial, disputed by industry and academic analysts. In addition to the
costs previously mentioned, the SEC rule identified a paperwork burden of
approximately 1,400 hours per firm to implement and 700 hours each in
subsequent years.81
There are many ways to hypothetically demonstrate CMR’s impact on
firms. We demonstrate here by a simple calculation. Given the Commission’s
estimated hours and the number of companies subject to CMR,
implementation per business represents approximately the equivalent of
thirty-five work weeks plus 17.5 work weeks per year thereafter, per capita
business. That implies at minimum each affected firm having to hire at last
one full time employee each to comply with the rule.82 Based upon the
number of affected firms, the calculation suggests industry would have to
divert hiring from productive value-added employment to hiring in excess of
262,000 employees to merely research, file, monitor and produce compliance
reports to the SEC on CMR. This does not include the hours and expense of
independent commercial audit mandated by the rule.
These costs go somewhere and ultimately they turn up in increased cost
of product, reduced quantity (or quality) of product to consumers, or
diminished earnings to shareholders. These costs also add to a growing list of
incentives for businesses to go private, a trend that could adversely impact
capital market efficiency. To the extent they lessen or impede competition,
79
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consumers also could suffer. One interesting exercise, beyond this paper, is
to figure out for example, that cost impact on a common product such as
Campbell’s soup. The venerable Campbell’s produces two billion cans a
year.83
The “chilling effect” of the CMR is intended to have on users of
Conflict Minerals, itself, implicates potential economic unintended
consequences. As commentators to the rule noted to the SEC, firms have
choices in materials and often time substitutes (all be them more expensive).
The rule may trigger a de facto boycott of legitimate mineral producers in
nations or adjoining countries adversely impacting their economic
development, creating unemployment/poverty that feeds new violence and
human rights abuses the rule is aimed to stop. Moreover, the substitution of
suppliers may shift to mineral sources from nations with demonstrably more
adverse human rights records than the DRC.84
Finally, as has been seen in advances in technology, the rules artificial
inflation of costs provides an incentive for industry to find substitute
materials or designs that do not use the conflict minerals at all, at which
point, the rule may well become moot, except for the poverty created in once
producer nations.
In short the Conflict Minerals Rule and its mandate arises at a time the
United States has experienced forty-four months of unemployment in excess
of eight percent, slow growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), declining
personal income, record government deficit spending and growing
competitiveness overseas. It comes at a time when the U.S. is attempting to
retain manufacturing to stem the decade’s long movement of jobs overseas
and maintain technological leadership. Consequently, the good intentions of
informing the public of trade with DRC portend to be more than offset by
loss of jobs and/or reduced competitiveness against non U.S. commercial
enterprises.
The nation faces challenges and priorities with limited resources in the
regulation of commerce? The public policy question is whether such priority
inures to CMR at this time, place and cost. The legality of the rule itself
remains problematic, the negative cost implications are huge.

F. Fundamental Rights: First Amendment
To this point we have highlighted potential areas of legal challenge to
the Conflict Minerals Rule that arise under various judicial rulings,
83
Campbells, Our Company: Soup http://www.campbellsoupcompany.com/atw_usa.asp (last
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84
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requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Exchange Acts.
The final key area represents a most important one and that is where a
regulatory rule impinges on fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to its citizens, including businesses.
The First Amendment sets a high bar to government interference and the
regulatory rule in question is subjected to the test of strict scrutiny
established by the Supreme Court initially under Carolene Products.85 The
current Supreme Court despite its differences has been quite firm on the free
speech rights of businesses against unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious
government interference in commercial free speech rights.86
Plaintiffs in the NAM case raised for the first time the argument that
§1502 in fact compels speech in violation of the Constitution’s First
Amendment.87 Here NAM points out citing Wooley that the first amendment
protects the right to speak and “to refrain from speaking.”88
NAM further points out that because the regulation requires firms to
state whether their products are “DNR Conflict Free or Not,” even where the
information is unknown, forces a disclosure that has the effect of imposing a
“Scarlet Letter,” compelling the company to associate or appear to associate
with a political group (sic. DNR) engaged in human rights violations.89
Consequently, the innocent inability of a firm to confirm its metal content
was not of DNR origin, ceteris paribus, leaves an inaccurate and negative
inference in the public and customer’s mind that the firm does have DNR
content.
NAM further states that the compelled disclosures required under CMR
are neither factual, uncontroversial or politically neutral. Rather, “they
require commercial firms to make statements pregnant with political
judgments and connections regarding events in foreign countries.”90
Citing the recent R.J. Reynolds ruling91, NAM points out that the CMR is
not a regulation preventing misleading advertising nor does it represent a
narrowly tailored safety issue that falls within the least burdensome standards
of strict scrutiny. Finally, even under an intermediate scrutiny standard, NAM
asserts the statute and rule fails to “directly and materially advance” a clearly
defined, substantial government interest. Rather, the regulatory scheme at
85
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best provides an ineffective, remote support for a generalized governmental
purposes.92
It is important to note again that while §1502 presents complex,
expensive reporting, it does not bar trade with DRC nor the use of conflict
minerals that originate there. This key factor belies a government argument
of “compelling state interest” under strict or intermediate scrutiny. That is, if
the situation were so compelling, trade would be outright banned as Congress
does with North Korea, Cuba, Iran and other non-human rights compliant
nations.
[T]here are many far less speech-restrictive (and more direct) ways
the government could pursue its goal of benefitting the DRC. Most
obviously, the government could pursue political and diplomatic
means. As dissenting Commissioner Gallagher remarked, “I am not
a foreign or humanitarian policy expert, but it seems to me that
taking the fight directly to the warlords would be a much more
effective process than waiting and hoping for some positive
trickledown effect attributable to new SEC reporting requirements
under section 1502.93
The Conflict Minerals Rule under these circumstances appears to breach
the important line of First Amendment jurisprudence, compelling political
speech that is both burdensome, inaccurate and stigmatizing, in this case to
impacted businesses.

III. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES TO HUMAN RIGHTS
At the end of the day, what has been accomplished? After all Congress’
entire exercise in enacting §1502 and delegating to the SEC alleges a
singular purpose; to help eradicate the income to only those mines supporting
the armed gangs responsible for corruption and wrecking havoc in human
rights in the DRC. On this point, there is scant evidence that the law as
constituted will have any positive effect and more likely than not, the
contrary.
As analysts have pointed out, were the rule fully implemented human
rights would not only not be improved in DRC but perhaps even worsened.
As pointed out in the NAM Brief, the World Bank estimates 16% of the
DNC’s population (approximately 10 million people) depend on its mining
industry. In gold production, for example, nearly all DRC gold is produced
92
93
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by artisanal miners. These small scale mines are legitimate businesses at risk
of losing business and employment. Accounting and trade in Central Africa
is not precise enough to differentiate the legitimate DRC mines from those
supporting the illegitimate armed gangs afflicting human rights abuses.94
Consequently, the chilling effect placed by the CMR rule on trade in the
region creates a de facto embargo that irreparably creates hardships on
innocent Congolese citizenry. To the extent this creates more poverty, greater
human suffering will occur. This also extends to innocent adjacent nations
such as Tanzania that are not part of the human rights issue (while not
including nations such as Zimbabwe which is a major human rights abuser).95
The GAO is currently studying these on-the-ground impacts.
Secondly, borders of the DRC and adjacent nations are extremely
porous. It is relatively easy for the operators of suspect mines in the DRC to
disguise mine origin or otherwise smuggle these metals across border in
ways that are indistinguishable. Metals are raw commodities undifferentiated
normally by place of origin. In fact it is stated that nearly 100% of Congo’s
gold is already smuggled.96
A significant factor present may be the rule’s future impact in causing
businesses to find substitute materials. For example, a substitution of tin by
another equally viable metal or alloy would drop the world demand for that
metal and its price. The effect would not be felt exclusively in the DRC.
Rather, it would negatively impact many other third world nations in which
U.S. policy is involved in advancing economic development. Emerging
nations in Asia, South America and Africa could see their economies
plunged into more economic distress resulting in political instability,
violence, and violations of human rights; precisely opposite the intentions of
Congress.
Crushing the open market for minerals achieves the opposite of
Section 1502’s stated aims. Creating a permanent de facto embargo
would permanently deprive many miners of their livelihoods, make
them more likely to join armed groups, and harm communities that
have thus far resisted being taken over by armed groups. Creating a
permanent de facto embargo would also entrench the smuggling of
minerals out of the DRC, where they will either be falsely labeled
as originating elsewhere, or will be sold to buyers indifferent to
provenance.97
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Economic sanctions have historically proven to be problematic in their
enactment and implementation. This is because the effectiveness of trade
restrictions can be offset by extreme deleterious effects to the trading nation
imposing the restriction. The restriction or ban on imports is generally
referred to in law as an “embargo.” This is differentiated by the affirmative
use of force to cut off all trade of necessities and commerce of any kind,
known as a “blockade,” which in international law is an act of war.98
Where the restricted target nation is small, of little to no threat to the
U.S. or does not possess rare commodities in high demand, the restriction can
have minimal domestic U.S. impact. On the other hand, if the U.S. and its
industry depend on the target nation’s commodity the opposite effect can
occur. Hence, bans on trade with North Korea and Cuba have little to no
major impact on the U.S. The ban on trade with Iran, a major oil producer, is
totally mitigated by major U.S., North American and other international
sources.
Two examples from U.S. history make this point. In response to British
acts of seizing U.S. merchant ships on the high seas and impressing U.S.
seaman in the early 1800’s, President Thomas Jefferson and Congress passed
the Embargo Act of 1807.99 The law effectively banned all imports of goods
from Great Britain. While in theory this would compel a change in the bad
acts of the English and perhaps stimulate domestic economic development in
our still fledgling republic, the effect was precisely the opposite. The law
caused extreme economic damage to the U.S. economy including shortage of
goods, dislocation of employment, wages and inflation.100 Without the
modern tools of enforcement technology, smuggling of English goods at
inflated prices was rampant across the border with Canada and through
transit from Central and South America. The U.S. Treasury at the time its
revenue primarily dependent on customs duties, suffered major revenue loss.
To stem further economic damage Congress repealed the law two years later
(1809).101
A more modern example was the precursor to World War II, the United
States embargo against the Imperial Empire of Japan. President Franklin
98
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Roosevelt and Congress’s response to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, China
and its human rights atrocities was the Export Control Act of 1940102
Originally halting the trade in airplanes, parts, machine tools, oil, metals,
rubber and petroleum products, the law was later expanded to exclude all
trade.103 Japan at that time derived 90% of its trade from imports and faced
devastating economic effects. Most historians today view the embargo as the
key trigger to Japan’s decision to attack the U.S. at Pearl Harbor, December
7, 1941, and the U.S. entry into World War II.104
Because the use of an embargo poses such extreme risks both
economically and potentially to national security, it is not to be engaged
lightly and certainly not within the bowels of an unrelated massive financial
industry regulatory bill. Nevertheless, the Conflict Minerals Rule poses just
such economic risks to the general welfare of U.S. industry and
manufacturing. Rather than directly addressing the issue of a trade estoppel
in conflict minerals, Congress by its stated intent seeks to establish what
amounts to a de facto embargo on the D.R. Congo and its adjoining nations.
Experts in their amicus brief in the NAM case have raised this issue:
Even the highly sophisticated companies that have participated in
the OECD’s due diligence pilot program have reported “an
increasing number of their customers requesting the exclusion of
minerals coming from the [eastern DRC] due to the SEC Final
Rule, which in their view creates increased cost and public
disclosure,” and that the SEC’s rule is the primary incentive for
companies to stop sourcing from the region.105
Though they pose no direct military threat, these countries control vast
deposits of not only the targeted conflict minerals but other strategic natural
resources on which the U.S. and its allied nations depend. These resources
are also of value to nations which the U.S. and its allies oppose. The affected
nations and more broadly the Organization of African States are presented
with a demonstrably discriminatory law that isolates the continent of Africa
while ignoring like practices by nations elsewhere in the world. That such
suspect classification in the context of history would be interpreted as racial
is a foregone conclusion.
CMR has consequently set the stage for potential damage to U.S.
foreign policy and diplomacy in an important emerging world sector. To the
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extent the policy causes nations adverse to Western interests to exploit these
resources, including fostering para-military activities serving to de-stable
democratic African governments,106this then posits, perhaps one of the most
serious of unintended consequences of CMR. That is, Congress unwittingly
opening a Pandora’s Box, exposing significant national foreign policy and
national security risks to a regulatory agency completely devoid of mission,
experience, knowledge, professional competence and demonstrably
unprepared to engage in foreign policy and national security matters.107
Could there be any greater example of irrationality per se using the rational
basis test to federal courts?108
Finally, both Congress and the SEC ignore the deleterious impact
downstream on the American consumer. Whether one accepts the SEC’s
estimated cost of the CMR or those of academic and industry analysts, the
billions of dollars of compliance cost come from somewhere and that is the
price of goods to U.S. consumers. Moreover, the rule establishes in effect a
government-sanctioned unfair trade practice, in that it structurally imposes
high costs on public corporations, not equally imposed on similarly situated
private and government corporations. To the extent these differences impact
prices; public firms face deleterious effects which at the extreme can lead to
layoffs, offshore relocation or business failure.
Already coming out of the deepest recession since the 1930’s and facing
anemic growth in GDP, the deadweight costs of CMR pass through the
supply chain and into every product affected. Hence, it works precisely
against both Congress and the President’s goal to advance the American
economy, provide price stability and advance employment, particularly in
domestic manufacturing.
106

Witness the ongoing 2013 civil strife in the Republic of Mali by Anti-Western Islamic
terrorist groups. See Steven Erlanger, French Intervention in Mali Raises Threat of Domestic
Terrorism, Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES, February 23, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/world/europe/french-intervention-in-mali-raises-threatof-domestic-terrorism-judge-says.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
107
Expert Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 24-26.
108
The CMR raises another issue in longstanding debate over constitutional separation of
powers and U.S. Presidential authority over foreign policy and national security. The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission is an independent regulatory agency, not under the
direct control of the Executive Branch. The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and
National Security Advisor serve at the pleasure of the President and carry out the President’s
foreign policies. Hence, §1502’s delegation of “rulemaking,” impacting U.S. foreign policy
may well be viewed by those subscribing to the “executive primacy” interpretation of
constitutional power over foreign and national security as an improper, if not illegal,
delegation by Congress. This is another problematic issue for further research beyond the
scope of this paper. For a more full discussion of the constitutional issue see H. Jefferson
Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: an Executive Branch Perspective, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527-76 (1999).

216/Vol. XXIV/Southern Law Journal

Closely related to the cost imposition on industry is the increased cost to
the SEC which in a government era of austerity will be forced to make
choices on enforcing and administering CMR with its numerous
complications versus carrying out its primary mission of regulating the
public securities markets. Given that conflict of resource allocation, agency
attention to CMR in all likelihood will be relegated to the back burner, but
having in the process forced industry to expend billions of dollars to no good
outcome.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Dodd Frank-Conflict Minerals Rule (§1502) was enacted with good
intentions and laudable purposes. Nevertheless, it is already proving to be a
classic example of the Law of Unintended Consequences in government
commercial regulation at work. Fostered inappropriately on a regulatory
agency ill prepared to implement it, placing extraordinary dead weight costs
on industry, compromising free speech rights, poorly articulated for
compliance, and operationally unintelligible in many respects, the rule
ultimately imposes more damage on regulators and industry than any
demonstrable (or even cognizable) benefit to the public. Indeed, the rule
itself may well unintentionally produce precisely the opposite of the desired
effects.
The NAM case will provide the first major appellate review of the both
the statute and SEC rulemaking on the subject. But NAM will only be but one
of a host of new cases that will proceed through the trial courts and into the
appellate courts. We may well see CMR become the poster child for the
“Rational Basis Test” invalidation of irrational government regulatory
rulemaking.
The great danger of the promulgation of the type of regulation
represented by CMR, of course, is that unchecked, Congress may structurally
expand this technique of commercial law and regulation to include the
panoply of the other 118 elements of the Periodic Table109 and designate the
bad actor nation du jour for business reporting and regulatory scrutiny.
Today it is the conflict minerals from DRC. What element and nation
will be next, to what end and what political purpose? In a global marketplace
this risks a legal and regulatory morass of grand proportions which takes the
eye of industry and government off of growth and full employment of its
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citizenry. There is a limit to cost impositions by Congress on industry
recognized by the courts. “[N]o legislation pursues its purpose at all costs.”110
Congress, itself, has demonstrated that it cannot and does not act in a
timely capacity to remove a “reformed” nation from such scrutiny, leaving
the country of origin and its commercial users in cost, trade and regulatory
limbo. In fact §1502 contains no mechanism for the SEC, Secretary of State
or President of the United States to extinguish the rule in a timely manner on
the day when DRC miraculously rids itself of armed gangs, reforms itself and
joins the “legitimate” Commonwealth of Nations.
As but one case in point, Congress’ famous Jackson-Vanik Amendment
of 1974 was enacted to deny “most favored nation status” to the Soviet
Union and its communist eastern block nations (“Warsaw Pact”), then
blocking immigration of its citizens who desired to leave for religious or
political purposes.111 The Soviet Union, Berlin Wall and communist east bloc
nations all disappeared into the pages of history over twenty-five years ago,
yet in the year 2013, Jackson-Vanick remains on the books; a continuing
impediment to relations and trade with the current Russian Republic.
Regardless of political inclinations, there is a clear public policy
expectation that commercial regulations promulgated have public value, are
implemented effectively, and represent the least intrusive necessary to
accomplish the public purpose. Such tests of scrutiny have well established
precedent in U.S. law. Both the statutory language of §1502 and the
promulgation of CMR implementation raise material questions of whether
the government meets the test of providing a “narrowly tailored” approach to
a compelling government interest. More importantly, the rule appears to
severely fail the test of establishing the “least restrictive means” of
implementing that interest.112 The public and public policy imperative was
not heard.
The Conflict Minerals Rule reveals yet again a common observation that
corporations make for poor foreign diplomats as government makes poor
business managers. No one countenances the behavior of human rights
abusers in the DNC or any other world nation. It is a constant struggle of
compassion and American leadership to address them. On the other hand, we
do no favors to the people of those nations, nor our own citizenry by
jeopardizing our own economic welfare on speculative mechanisms of
dubious impact to address these issues.
The proponents of Dodd-Frank’s Conflict Minerals Rule may have
heard a stanza of special interest groups or the tune of their own
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humanitarianism, but not the entire public policy symphony by American
voters. Regardless of political inclinations we live in an era of limited
resources to support government regulation. There is broad consensus that
where government regulation exists it should be for a compelling purpose,
rationally crafted in its implementation to be both effective and economical.
What Congress failed to hear and failed to heed was the, march of
American citizenry of all stripes; bipartisan that overall melody might be. In
so doing Congress Conflict Mineral Rule stands as yet a prominent
representative symbol of a tin ear of government regulation.
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EXHIBIT A: CONFLICT MINERALS RULE FLOW CHART
(Source: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)113
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